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Abstract
■ Attention includes processes that evaluate stimuli relevance,
select the most relevant stimulus against less relevant stimuli,
and bias choice behavior toward the selected information. It
is not clear how these processes interact. Here, we captured
these processes in a reinforcement learning framework applied
to a feature-based attention task that required macaques to
learn and update the value of stimulus features while ignoring
nonrelevant sensory features, locations, and action plans. We
found that value-based reinforcement learning mechanisms
could account for feature-based attentional selection and
choice behavior but required a value-independent stickiness se-
lection process to explain selection errors while at asymptotic
behavior. By comparing different reinforcement learning
schemes, we found that trial-by-trial selections were best pre-
dicted by a model that only represents expected values for the
task-relevant feature dimension, with nonrelevant stimulus fea-
tures and action plans having only a marginal influence on covert
selections. These findings show that attentional control sub-
processes can be described by (1) the reinforcement learning of
feature values within a restricted feature space that excludes irrel-
evant feature dimensions, (2) a stochastic selection process on
feature-specific value representations, and (3) value-independent
stickiness toward previous feature selections akin to persevera-
tion in the motor domain. We speculate that these three mecha-
nisms are implemented by distinct but interacting brain circuits
and that the proposed formal account of feature-based stimulus
selection will be important to understand how attentional sub-
processes are implemented in primate brain networks. ■
INTRODUCTION
Selective attention can be defined as a set of processes
that work around resource limitations by prioritizing
processing to goal-relevant information (Womelsdorf &
Everling, 2015; Tsotsos, 2011), while ensuring flexibility
to adapt to new situations (Ardid & Wang, 2013; Kruschke
& Hullinger, 2010; Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000).
Such a definition of attention implicitly assumes a con-
tinuous evaluation of the relevance of sensory information
(Gottlieb, 2012; Kaping, Vinck, Hutchison, Everling, &
Womelsdorf, 2011), which entails computing value pre-
dictions of stimulus features (Rangel & Clithero, 2014;
Anderson, 2013; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della
Libera, 2013; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, &
Behrens, 2011). Consistent with this suggestion, recent
neurophysiological studies have shown that neural repre-
sentations of stimulus value affect attentional search per-
formance and gaze allocation in human participants
(Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Tatler, Hayhoe, Land,
& Ballard, 2011; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009) and under-
lie economic choices (Hare, Schultz, Camerer, O’Doherty,
& Rangel, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Wunderlich,
Rangel, & O’Doherty, 2010). Furthermore, neural cor-
relates of those signals have been found in prefrontal and
parietal neurons as well as in subcortical neural circuits (Cai
& Padoa-Schioppa, 2014; Luk & Wallis, 2013; Peck, Lau, &
Salzman, 2013; Kaping et al., 2011; Kennerley, Behrens, &
Wallis, 2011; Peck, Jangraw, Suzuki, Efem, & Gottlieb,
2009). However, it is unclear how value-based learning
relates to the covert attentional selection of stimulus fea-
tures that precedes overt choices, as opposed to the learn-
ing of action values that immediately triggers overt choices
(Glimcher, 2011; Lau & Glimcher, 2005). To elucidate the
mechanisms that underlie attention, task paradigms and
analyses need to isolate the learning of covert (attentional)
stimulus selection from processes linked to overt choice
such as perceptual discrimination and action planning
(Rangel & Clithero, 2014).
In the decision-making domain, reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) provides a framework that links stimulus or
action valuation to choice behavior (Rangel & Hare, 2010;
Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). Commonly applied RL
realizes goal-directed choices by (1) the continuous up-
dating of value predictions of sensory features, (2) a soft-
max stochastic choice process among features that ensure
performance accuracy while allowing for occasional
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exploratory choices, and (3) rapid learning from the con-
sequences (outcomes) of selections using prediction error
signals (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). These processing
components could likewise account for the efficient
top–down control of attention and may thus provide a
framework to understand the interplay of attentional
subprocesses (Womelsdorf & Everling, 2015; Wilson &
Niv, 2011; Roelfsema & van Ooyen, 2005; Dayan et al.,
2000). To test this hypothesis, we devised a feature-
based reversal learning task for macaque monkeys that
allowed quantifying whether commonly used RL frame-
works help to understand how the learning of efficient
attentional control is implemented and integrated during
goal-directed behavior.
We found that the learning of attentional stimulus
selections in nonhuman primates closely followed an
RL model that acts on representations of a restricted
set of task-relevant features, rather than on a represen-
tation of all stimulus and action items that could be
linked to the decision outcome (Rangel & Clithero,
2014). However, we also show that a feature-based RL
model of attention needs to be supplemented with a
value-independent stickiness process to account for non-
randomly distributed errors during asymptotic behavior.
METHODS
Experiments were performed in two male macaque
monkeys following guidelines of the Canadian Council
of Animal Care policy on the use of laboratory animals
and of the University of Western Ontario Council on
Animal Care. Monkeys sat in a custom-made primate
chair viewing visual stimuli on a computer monitor (85-Hz
refresh rate, distance of 58 cm) in a sound-attenuating
isolation chamber (Crist Instrument Co., Inc., Hagerstown,
MD). The monitor covered 36° × 27° of visual angle at a
resolution of 28.5 pixel/deg. Eye positions were moni-
tored using a video-based eye-tracking system (ISCAN,
Woburn, MA; sampling rate: 120 Hz) and were calibrated
before each experiment to a 5-point fixation pattern.
During the experiments, eye fixation on a 0.2° gray square
was controlled within a 1.4–2.5° radius window. Monitoring
of eye positions, stimulus presentation, and reward deliv-
ery were controlled through MonkeyLogic (open-source
software, www.monkeylogic.net) running on a PC Pentium
III (Asaad & Eskandar, 2008). Liquid reward was delivered
by a custom-made, air compression-controlled, mechanical
valve system with a noise level during valve openings of
≤17 dB within the isolation chamber.
Task Design
We trained the monkeys on a feature-based reversal
learning task (Figure 1A). The task required monkeys
to fixate and covertly attend to one of two peripherally
presented stimuli. Stimuli had different colors, and only
one color was associated with reward across trials within
a block. To obtain reward, the animals had to discriminate
a transient rotation of the attended stimulus. Rotations
also occurred in the stimuluswith the non-reward-associated
Figure 1. Feature-based
attentional learning task. (A)
Uncued task design. Monkeys
learned by practice that only the
color dimension of the stimuli
was associated with reward,
whereas other features
(location, rotation direction, or
time onset of the rotation) were
completely irrelevant. A proper
allocation of covert attention
allowed monkeys to successfully
discriminate a transient rotation
in the relevant stimulus while
ignoring that of the distractor.
Monkeys reported their
response with an upward versus
downward saccade according to
the rotation direction, which
was reversed in the two
monkeys. (B) Color–reward
associations were changed in
blocks of trials. (C) Average
performance for Monkeys M
and S as a function of trial
number in the block. The
shaded area denotes the 95%
confidence interval. Avg. =
average; stim = stimulus.
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color. Monkeys indicated their choice by making a sac-
cadic eye movement to one of two response targets pre-
sented 6.7° above or below the fixation point (clockwise/
counterclockwise rotations were mapped onto upward/
downward saccades for one monkey and onto down-
ward/upward saccades for the second monkey). In each
block of trials, reward was associated only with one color.
No reward was given to rotation discriminations of the
stimulus with the nonrewarded color. Rotation direction
(clockwise vs. counterclockwise), location (right vs. left),
and the time onset of rotation of the stimulus with re-
warded and nonrewarded color (first vs. second vs. simul-
taneous) changed randomly across trials. In each trial, the
stimulus with the rewarded color and the stimulus with
the nonrewarded color rotated in opposite directions.
The event sequence in a trial was as follows (Figure 1A).
Monkeys initiated trials by directing and maintaining their
gaze on a centrally presented, gray fixation point (on a
black, 0.6-cd background), followed 0.3 sec later by the
onset of two stimuli. Within the stimulus aperture, motion
direction of a grating to the left from fixation was always
to the upper left (−45° from vertically up), and motion
direction of the stimulus on the right side from fixation
was always to the upper right (+45° from vertically up).
After 0.4 sec, the stimuli were colored. The rotation of
the rewarded and nonrewarded stimulus occurred either
at 0.75 sec or at 1.35 sec. Trials in which the stimulus with
the rewarded color rotated before or after the stimulus
with the nonrewarded color were counterbalanced. In
10–50% (on average, 30%) of all trials, the rotation of
the stimuli with the rewarded and nonrewarded color
occurred at the same time (1 sec after the color onset).
Trials with rotations at the same time were introduced
to validate that animals succeeded to select the relevant
stimulus before discriminating the relevant rotation direc-
tion. This manipulation ensured that monkeys could per-
form the task only above chance when the stimulus with
the rewarded color (and not the distractor, or a response
direction, or other aspects) was selected. After stimulus
rotation, animals made a saccadic response toward either
of two target dots located vertically, above versus below,
with respect to the fixation point, to report the rotation
direction of the chosen stimulus. To obtain reward, a sac-
cade had to be made 0.05–0.5 sec after rotation onset of
the stimulus associated with the rewarded color. Animals
received a fluid reward with a delay of 0.4 sec after the
saccadic response.
Within an experimental session, the color–reward asso-
ciation was alternated in blocks of 60–100 trials, either
maintaining the same pair of colors or by introduction
of a new pair (Figure 1A). After a minimum of 60 trials,
a new block was introduced as soon as either of three
performance criteria was achieved: (1) running average
performance (over 15 preceding trials) of rewarded
correct sensory–response associations relative to un-
rewarded incorrect choices exceeded 80%, (2) a total
number of 60 rewarded trials, or (3) a total number of
100 trials independent on whether the choice was re-
warded. Each experimental session also included shorter
blocks of (n = 30) cued trials, which, besides the cue
instruction, had identical timing and stimulus events as
the uncued trials described above. In cued trials, the fix-
ation point was colored to match the color of one of the
peripheral stimuli, which was indicative of that stimulus
being relevant. Stimulus colors used in the cued trials
were never used in the uncued trials. Cued trials were
not analyzed in this report.
Stimuli
We used square wave gratings with rounded-off edges for
the peripheral stimuli (Figure 1A), moving within a circu-
lar aperture at 1 deg/sec, a spatial frequency of 1.4 Hz/deg,
and a radius of 2.2°. Gratings were presented at 4–6°
eccentricity to the left and right of fixation. The grating
on the left (right) side always moved within the aperture
upwards at −45° (+45°) relative to vertical. The angle of
rotation ranged between ±13° and ±19°. The rotation
proceeded smoothly from the standard direction of
motion toward maximum tilt within 60 msec, staying at
maximum tilt for 235 msec, rotated back to the standard
direction within 60 msec, and continued moving at their
prechanged direction of motion at −45° or +45° relative
to vertical thereafter.
Analysis of Performance and
Learning within Blocks
Data analysis was done with custom written MATLAB
scripts (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). Analysis was
performed on n= 200 experimental sessions (n= 100 ses-
sions for Monkey M and n= 100 sessions from Monkey S).
To identify at which trial during a block the monkeys
showed statistically reliable learning, we analyzed the
monkeys’ trial-by-trial choice dynamics using the state
space framework introduced by Smith and Brown (2003)
and implemented by Smith et al. (2004). This framework
entails a state equation that describes the internal learning
process as hidden Markov or latent process and is up-
dated each trial. The learning state process estimates
the probability of a correct response in each trial and thus
provides the learning curve of subjects (see, e.g., Wirth
et al., 2003). The algorithm estimated learning from the
perspective of an ideal observer that takes into account
all trial outcomes of the subjects in a block of trials to
estimate the probability that the outcome in a single trial
is correct or incorrect based on the modeled learning
state process. This probability is then used to calculate
the confidence range of observing a correct response.
We defined the learning trial as the earliest trial during a
block at which the lower confidence bound of the proba-
bility for a correct response exceeded the chance level
(here: p = .5).
Balcarras et al. 335
More specifically, the algorithm defines the learning
state process as a random walk whereby each trial’s prob-
ability of a correct response depends on the previous
trials probability or on the chance level in case there
was no previous trial’s probability at the beginning of
blocks. According to this formulation, the subjects’
choices across trials follow a random strategy. The mean
of the random process reflects the current probability for
a correct response. The variance of the random process
determines how fast the learning state process can
change from trial to trial and thus how rapidly learning
can take place (see Smith et al., 2004). The expectation
maximization algorithm is used to estimate the mean and
variance of the random process by maximum likelihood
(Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977) to derive the proba-
bility to observe a correct response in each trial as a func-
tion of the trial number (Smith & Brown, 2003). A
forward filter estimates the variance and mean of the
value of the Gaussian random variable from the first trial
to the current trial. This forward process reflects a state
estimate from the perspective of the subject performing
the task. An additional smoothing algorithm takes the
perspective of an ideal observer and estimates the cur-
rent trials’ mean and variance of the state process using
data from all trials. The estimates of both, the forward
filter and the smoothing process, are then used to cal-
culate the probability density for the correct response
probability at each trial (please see Smith et al., 2004,
Equations 2.1–2.4 for details). The aforementioned pro-
cedure provides the learning curve, that is, it provides
for each trial the probability of a correct response given
the sequence of correct and incorrect choices of the
monkey. To identify the first trial in a block at which an
ideal observer knows with p ≥ .95 confidence that learn-
ing has taken place, we calculated the lower confidence
bound and identified the first trial where it exceeded the
chance performance as the learning trial ( p = .5), the
first “IO95” learning trial (see Smith et al., 2004). This
corresponds to a .95 confidence level for an ideal observer
to identify learning.
Logistic Regression Analysis
We developed a logistic regression analysis (using the
glmfit function of MATLAB, The MathWorks, Inc.) over
the complete set of trials under consideration to check
whether RL mechanisms were overall consistent with
monkeys’ performance in the task and, if so, to infer spe-
cific RL characteristics that we could then use in the imple-
mentation of RL models (see below).
In particular, we analyzed and ranked the predictive
power for attentional selection of stimulus features. We
tested four different versions of the logistic regression
analysis depending on how features in trial T predicted
attentional selection of one of the two stimuli, and the
choice, in the following trial T + 1: Version 1 features
predict attentional selection of the stimulus they belong
(in trial T + 1) if they formed part of the previously
selected stimulus (inferred from choice in trial T ) regard-
less of outcome (note that this is a control case in which
the regression analysis is actually not consistent with
RL mechanisms); Version 2 features predict attentional
selection of the stimulus they belong (in trial T + 1) if
those features formed part of the previously selected
stimulus (in trial T ) and that trial was rewarded (this case
is compatible with RL, such that positively correlated fea-
ture–reward associations are reinforced for subsequent
attentional selection); Version 3 features predict atten-
tional selection of the stimulus they belong (in trial T +
1) if those features did not form part of the previously
selected stimulus (in trial T ) and that trial was not re-
warded; and Version 4 that combines the previous two
conditions, so features predict attentional selection of
the stimulus they belong (in trial T + 1) if they formed
part of the previously selected stimulus (in trial T ) and
that trial was rewarded as well as if they did not form part
of the previously selected stimulus and the trial was not
rewarded.
Interestingly, results from this latter condition were
best predictive of monkey choices (Figure 2, other condi-
tions not shown), which suggest a value-update generali-
zation of the features in the two stimuli, even when
monkeys in each trial only acted on one of the two stimuli.
We performed the ranking on half of the sessions (odd
session numbers) and validated this ranking of features
on the other half of the sessions (even session numbers).
Figure 2 shows the proportion of choices explained with
respect to chance level from a collection of regression
analyses, in which each analysis included one more re-
gressor than the previous, beginning with the regressor
with the largest predictive power and continuing accord-
ing to the predictive power ranking, until all regressors
were taken into account. These results confirmed that
colors were the best predictors of next choices, support-
ing the hypothesis of value-based covert attentional se-
lection guiding monkeys’ behavior.
Because of the two-alternative choice, the chance level
was computed as 50% of the trials in which at least one of
the features in the feature set was present in trial T + 1
and formed part of the stimulus associated with reward
by task design in trial T (hence predictive of choice in trial
T + 1; also note that this did not necessarily imply that
monkeys acted on the stimulus associated with reward
in trial T ). For instance, for Monkey M, the first regressor
(color C3) correctly predicted 21.35% of the next choices.
This represented 86.44% of the trials in which the color
C3 determined the stimulus associated with reward by
task design (24.7% of the whole set of trials, far beyond
the chance level at 12.35%). Importantly, the proportion
of trials explained initially grew at a similar pace while
including colors in the regression analysis but then dras-
tically stopped, showing that including other features did
not improve further the predictive power of monkey
choices (Figure 2). Note also the increasing separation
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with respect to the chance level when incorporating color
features to the regression analysis, until it reached its
maximum when all colors were included in the analysis.
This separation remained the same after including non-
color features to the regression analysis (Figure 2).
RL Modeling
To model monkeys’ behavior and the processes related
to covert attentional selection, we used Rescorla–Wagner
type of RL employing standard Q-Learning and Boltzman
softmax selection algorithms (Glimcher, 2011). We initially
compared two distinct value-based RL models that dif-
fered in whether a restricted, optimal feature set (com-
posed only of stimulus colors) was used to select one of
the two peripheral stimuli (“feature-based RL”) or whether
the selection process considered all features (“nonselective
RL”).
To explain a specific pattern of error trials shown by
the monkeys, which was not reproduced by value-based
models, we explored additional non-value-based mecha-
nisms: First, we accounted for an influence of selection
perseveration that is unaffected by values, which has
been shown to improve action selection (Lau & Glimcher,
2005). This value history model (Figure 6A) transforms
feature values into probabilities of attentional selection
as the feature-based RL does, but it then incorporates a
weighted bias toward whatever feature was selected on
the previous trial.
The second extension of feature-based RL, the hierar-
chical value-history model, is similar to the previous value
history model, but in this formulation, the value-based
selection process is concatenated with a subsequent final
attentional selection between the selected feature in the
previous trial versus the current trials’ value-based selected
feature (Figure 6B). This sequential selection can therefore
be conceived of as a hierarchical two-step decision process.
Third, we quantified the influence of a mechanism that
dynamically adjusted the exploration versus exploitation
trade-off based on performance. This adaptive selection
model incorporated a meta-learning parameter that
scaled up or down the nonlinearity in the transformation
from value to probability of attentional selection accord-
ing to reward outcome (Figure 6C). Thus, when model
performance is low, typically at the beginning of a block,
more exploratory behavior is produced because of a low
β value, because it increases the stochasticity of selection
among features. As rewarded outcomes become more
frequent, β increases, which makes attentional selection
be more deterministic.
In a fourth model extension, we incorporated non-
value-based noise into the attentional selection process
(Figure 6D). In this intrinsic noise model, such noise is
evenly distributed among all stimulus features. Thus, there
is no dependence on value, reward, or selection history in
this module of the model, but rather an explicit influence
of noise, intrinsic to the transformation of value-based
selections to motor commands because of influences,
such as decreased motivation, imperfect sensory-motor
mappings, or selection biases, among others, under the
assumption that these influences do not show a preference
for specific features in the internal model representation
of the task.
RL Model Algorithms
In its basic form, the value of any predictor of reward (Qi)
is updated on the next time step (trial) from its previous
value through the scaled reward-prediction error: the dif-
ference between the binary reward outcome (R, either 0
Figure 2. Logistic regression
analysis of monkey performance
in the task. We ranked the
predictive power of each
stimulus feature for subsequent
performance according to a
logistic regression analysis
(see Methods for details).
In both monkeys, the
regression that included only
color information was the




stimulus features to guide their
covert attentional selection.
(A) Monkey M. (B) Monkey S.
In both panels, labels “C1,”
“C2,” “C3,” and “C4” in the
figure denote the individual stimulus colors used; “ccw” and “cw” denote stimulus rotation direction; “R” and “L” denote stimulus locations;
and “1st” and “2nd” denote the relative time of movement onset of the rewarded stimulus in relation to that of the distractor.
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or 1) and the predictor itself. The scaling factor (α) rep-
resents the learning rate:
Qi nþ 1ð Þ ¼ Qi nð Þ þ α R nð Þ − Qi nð Þ½  (1)
We implemented RL models that assumed value gen-
eralization. Thus, all stimulus features associated with
the selected stimulus updated their value according to
Equation 1. Stimulus features associated with the other
stimulus were updated according to
Qi nþ 1ð Þ ¼ Qi nð Þ þ α 1 − R nð Þ − Qi nð Þ½  (2)
Our RL approach assumed that performance in a trial
only depended on a correct covert attentional selection
of the relevant stimulus, which implied an infallible rota-
tion discrimination and its associated saccadic response.
The “feature-based RL” took into account only the sys-
tematically relevant color dimension as predictor of atten-
tional selection and, therefore, of reward (Figure 3A). In
contrast, in the “nonselective RL,” all stimulus features
(colors, locations, rotation directions, and time onsets
of the rotation) were considered potential predictors of
reward (Figure 3B).
The final attentional selection of one stimulus against
the other obeyed a covert, value-based softmax decision-
making process acting on the feature space, in particular,
on nonlinearly transformed values that represented the
probabilities of selecting different stimulus features, accord-
ing to the Boltzmann equation:






where β represents the inverse temperature and estab-
lishes the strength of the nonlinearity. The two RL models
thus included two free parameters (α and β) that we
optimized to best predict monkey behavior on a trial-by-
trial basis (Figure 3).
Value History Model
The first extension of the feature-based formulation intro-
duces an explicit factor that influences the value-based
selection mechanism by biasing the selection toward
the feature that was selected previously, irrespective of
whether it was rewarded (Figure 6A). The selection of this
value history model is formally implemented as:
Pi nð Þ ¼ e
βQi nð Þ þ eγδik−1X
j
eβQj nð Þ þ eγδjk−1 (4)
where, in the γ term, k represents the previously selected
feature and appears inside a Kronecker delta function,
Figure 3. RL model schemes and results. (A) Feature-based RL tracks across trials’ (…, n − 1, n) reward-dependent values (Q) only for the
relevant stimulus features (colors, in the example: g = green, r = red) and nonlinearly transforms them into choice probabilities (P) of attentional
selection through a softmax function. (B) Nonselective RL works the same but tracks values for all task features, denoted as Color, Space (stimulus
location), Motion (rotation direction), and Time (order of each stimulus rotation onset). (C) The performance of the optimized feature-based
RL is better than the performance of the optimized nonselective RL for both monkeys (left, x axis: Monkey M; right, x axis: Monkey S). (D)
Optimization scores and parameters for feature-based (FB) RL and nonselective (NS) RL for Monkey M (blue shaded) and Monkey S (red shaded).
Multiple scores were used to explicitly account for different aspects of monkeys’ behavior and to directly test the predictive power of each RL
mechanism (see text and Methods for details). Lower scores denote better model prediction. Bold font highlights best scores relative to the
alternative model. SSD denotes normalized SSD in [0,1].
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which takes a value of 1 if i is equal to k or 0 otherwise.
The term −1 is included to remove any impact of the γ
term when γ is 0. The effect of γ can be described as an
increase in the probability to reselect the immediate
previous selection, which in principle might be beneficial
to diminish the impact of noise in the value system im-
plementation, at the cost of a reduced celerity in the
adaptation to changed feature–reward contingencies.
Hierarchical Value-History Model
As indicated above, the second extension of the model-
based RL is similar to the value history model, but in this
formulation, the selection process based on values is
concatenated with a subsequent selection between the
feature choice of the previous trial and the current trial
value-based selected feature (Figure 6B). This sequential
selection can be conceived of as a hierarchical two-step
decision process. The first process fully corresponds to
the feature-based selection process defined in Equation
3. From this selection, feature k is selected with “confi-
dence” Pk dictated by the softmax function and used in
a second step to compete with the previously selected
feature Pl (if feature l is different than feature k):
P0k ¼
Pk




Pk þ Pl (6)
where Pl = e
γ − 1. When the value-based selected fea-
ture k and the previously selected feature l are the same,
both terms add together, and the probability to select
the feature trivially collapses to 1.
Adaptive Selection Model
The third extension of the feature-based formulation
introduces a mechanism that adjusts the probabilistic
nature of the value-based selection process to either
trigger more exploratory selections or to more deter-
ministically follow the valuation mechanism (correspond-
ing to an exploitation regime with high confidence; see
Figure 6C). The selection of values in the adaptive selec-
tion model uses Equation 3, but with the difference that
β is not a constant but instead obeys an equation similar
to the Q values (Equations 1 and 2; note that R is a binary
teaching signal and then only one of the two terms in
Equation 7 is different than zero in each trial):
β nþ 1ð Þ ¼ β nð ÞþR nð Þμ βH−β nð Þ½ 
− 1−R nð Þ½ μβ nð Þ ð7Þ
where μ is the rate of change of β. β values are bounded
between 0 and βH. β tends to either one or the other
depending on the outcome (R). If the outcome is 1, then
β grows toward βH; otherwise, it decreases to 0. Thus,
after positive outcomes, the impact of β is to make the
softmax function (Pi above) more similar to a winner-
take-all but to otherwise encourage more exploratory
behavior. Therefore, this model becomes more or less
confident on the value system depending on outcome
evaluation.
Intrinsic Noise Model
The fourth extension assumes that part of behavioral
variability is in principle not explainable by value-based
updating and selection mechanisms but rather is because
of random behavioral variability and evenly distributed
among features (Figure 6D):
Pi nð Þ ¼ PRNF þ 1 − PRð Þ
eβQi nð Þ − 1X
j
eβQj nð Þ − 1
(8)
The term PR denotes the random behavioral proba-
bility that is evenly distributed among task features (NF
refers to the number of those). Note that −1 is intro-
duced to remove the contribution of Q-values that are
equal to 0. The value system is scaled down by the factor
1 − PR. This random weighting factor could theoretically
fit the data better compared with the pure value-based
model if the noise significantly splits into two parts:
one noise component in the softmax (among Q values
that are not strictly 0) and another noise component that
is non-value-based. This is because a single β parameter
in principle does not necessarily capture the two sources
of noise at once but instead is designed to capture value-
based stochasticity. This intrinsic noise model is similar
to the value history model by adding a non-value-based
process that competes with value, but for the intrinsic
noise model, the non-value-based process operates at
random among features instead of favoring the previous
attentional selection.
Model Evaluation and Optimization
Three independent criteria (outlined in detail below)
were combined to evaluate RL models. Such a multiscore
evaluation was critical to (1) account for the dynamics of
learning of monkeys in the task (performance sum of
squared differences [SSD]), (2) analyze the plausibility
of an RL mechanism for explaining monkey perfor-
mance (Mechanism SSD), and (3) maximize the total
number of trials in which monkeys and model perfor-
mance matched, corrected to penalize model biases
against the least frequent outcome (i.e., the overall pro-
portion of trials explained was corrected by subtracting
the highest between the proportion of false positives
and false negatives).
The first score represented the SSD between the block-
averaged performance of the model with respect to the
monkey over the same blocks of trials (Figures 4A and
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7A and C). The second score quantified the extent to
which the RL mechanism employed by a model was
compatible with monkeys’ behavior (Figures 4B and 7B
and D). The average model performance only depends
on the probability to select the relevant stimulus, and a
direct test of this mechanism can be applied to monkeys’
behavior: We binned the probability to select the relevant
stimulus and computed for them the averaged monkeys’
performance as well as its 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
If the averaged performance of the monkeys was largely
different from the probability to select the relevant stimu-
lus according to themodel, we can then conclude that such
mechanism would not be fully compatible with monkeys’
behavior, and this is visualized by deviations from the
diagonal in Figures 4B and 7B and D. After calculating
our measure of Performance SSD and Mechanism SSD,
we normalized these scores across all models and param-
eter sets (independently in each monkey) to ensure that
all scores were bounded in the same range [0,1].
The third measure evaluating the model performance
compared the outcome experienced by the monkey on
every trial with that of the model and calculated the total
proportion of correctly matching trials. The common de-
notation of this measure is proportion of total explained
trials. We modified this score to correct for the fact that it
is important for a model to not only predict a high pro-
portion of trials correctly but also ideally predict the cor-
rect proportion of rewarded and unrewarded trials,
avoiding any potential bias. For example, a toy model that
merely predicts a rewarded choice on every trial would
provide no insight into the mechanisms driving monkey
behavior but would report a total proportion explained
> 80% because of the overall high proportion of re-
warded behavior shown by the monkeys. We then cor-
rected the total explained score by the proportion of
false positives or false negatives (whichever was higher)
to provide a single score that combines both raw explan-
atory power and a measure of predictive accuracy. The
score appeared inverted (i.e., 1-score, corrected propor-
tion of unexplained trials, so a lower score reflected a
better model performance) to be in agreement with the
two previously described scores.
To summarize, we used the three model performance
scores to capture three distinct characteristics of the
monkeys’ behavior that standard model comparison
methods (e.g., Bayesian Information Criterion/Akaike
Information Criterion) would, at least partially, fail to
capture (see below). First, the performance score accounts
for the dynamics (trial-by-trial variation) in average per-
formance in the course of a block. Second, the scoring
explicitly tests the actual RL mechanism, that is, how
well the probability to select the relevant stimulus then
Figure 4. Performance of feature-based versus nonselective RL systems. (A) Average performance and its 95% CI (shaded area) as a function
of trial order within a block predicted from feature-based RL (top row) and nonselective RL (bottom row) for Monkeys M (left) and S (right).
The normalized SSD between the performance of the monkey and models served as one model evaluation criterion, labeled SSD Performance
in Figure 3D. (B) Monkeys’ averaged performance and its 95% CI (error bars) against the likelihood to select the relevant stimulus according
to models. The panels show the performance of the monkeys ( y axis) corresponding to five bins that fully span the range of the probability to
select the relevant stimulus. A plausible model candidate requires the model’s likelihood and monkey’s performance to match each other.
The degree to what this happens is quantified by the normalized SSD (labeled SSD Mechanism in Figure 3D). The panels are arranged as in
A: feature-based RL (top row), nonselective RL (bottom row), Monkey M (left column), and Monkey S (right column).
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translates in the average performance shown by the
monkeys, under the model assumption that, if a model is
“correct,” it should reflect a 1:1 mapping. Finally, the
“corrected total explained” performance score accounts
for the same overall average performance in the task,
while correcting for the different proportions of correct
and error trials.
Models were fit to the behavioral data of the monkeys
by performing a grid search across a broad region of the
parameter space, avoiding exploring regions not sensitive
to be feasible, such as those corresponding to extremely
large values of the inverse temperature parameter. We
first explored this parameter region for a given resolution
(e.g., in 0.1 steps for the learning rate) and then zoomed
in the area of interest, which was around the best scoring
value that we found, using finer resolutions until reaching
the point of no further improvement (e.g., 0.01 steps for
the learning rate). Grid searches following this procedure
produce analogous results to other methods, such as
gradient descent (e.g., Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin,
2014; Collins & Frank, 2013). We validated the results
of our optimization procedure through cross-validation
between odd and even numbered sessions. Model per-
formance was first assessed using odd numbered sessions
(calibration data set) of monkey data by calculating the
mean score for each parameter set across the three dif-
ferent measures, with each score representing the mean
of 10 model replications to diminish the impact of fluc-
tuations because of the stochasticity in the model. Please
note that the results were not different when using a
Bootstrap procedure with n = 100 replications. Then,
best aggregate scores for each model computed on odd
numbered sessions were used to assess model perfor-
mance on even numbered sessions (test data set).
Cross-validation of scores confirmed that parameters
were not fit to nonsystematic behavior (e.g., which would
have followed from overfitting) but instead represented
a generalizable version of the model (Ahn, Busemeyer,
Wagenmakers, & Stout, 2008).
Analysis of Error Patterns
Consecutive unrewarded trials during asymptotic perfor-
mance (toward the end of a block, after the learning
period; Figure 4A) were unlikely events in feature-
based and nonselective RL systems (Figure 5), because
feature values were very dissimilar and changed only
minimally at asymptote, so errors were only because of
the stochasticity of the selection process under such con-
ditions. This suggests a random and independent dis-
tribution of errors during this period, which would be
expected to happen also in monkey behavior if it would
follow directives of the feature-based or nonselective RL
system.
To test this null hypothesis, we counted all errors
made during asymptotic behavior in a blockwise fashion
and calculated the proportion of errors occurring in se-
quences of increasing length. To compare with a random
distribution, we subtracted the proportion of errors for
each error sequence from the theoretical proportion
given by a random distribution. This transformation
eased the identification of clusters of errors (i.e., un-
rewarded trials made consecutively), which occurred in
monkeys more frequently than predicted by the stochas-
ticity of learned values according to RL models (Figure 5).
This finding suggested an additional selection mecha-
nism influenced by non-value-based sources (Figure 6).
RESULTS
We devised a reversal learning task for macaques that iso-
lates the covert attentional selection of relevant sensory
(color) information from the perceptual discrimination
(rotations) and action planning (saccades) processes
directly involved in overt decision-making (Figure 1A).
Covert attention was required to select one of two periph-
erally (left and right) presented stimuli for prioritized
processing. Overt decision-making was required to obtain
reward through discriminating a transient (clockwise/
counterclockwise) rotation of the stimuli by making an
(upward/downward) saccadic eye movement. Monkeys
were rewarded only if the decision about the rotation
was performed on one of the two stimuli with no reward
given if the animal acted on the alternative stimulus. The
rewarded stimulus was defined by its color with the
reward-associated color changing between blocks of
trials. The task design ensured that the stimulus color
varied independently from (1) the stimulus location (right
or left), (2) the decision variable of the overt choice
(clockwise or counterclockwise rotation) that eventually
provided the outcome, (3) the action plan (upward or
Figure 5. Failure of feature-based and nonselective RL systems to
account for the pattern of consecutive errors shown by the animals
during periods of asymptotic performance. The panel shows how the
proportion of consecutive errors (x axis) by monkeys (M: left, S: right)
deviated from what would be expected if errors were generated by a
random process (dotted line). Feature-based RL (in blue) and
nonselective RL (in green) failed to capture this error pattern. The inset
bar panels show the SSD between the error pattern of monkeys and
models. Errors represent SEM.
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downward saccades) used to indicate overt choice, and
(4) the three possible time points at which the stimulus
rotation could occur. Thus, in contrast to previous learn-
ing paradigms in nonhuman primates (Lau & Glimcher,
2008; Sugrue, Corrado, & Newsome, 2004), the actual
reward associated feature (color) was independent of
action, location, and timing. The task enforced learning
reward predictions about specific colors by changing the
reward-associated color after a performance criterion, or a
maximum number of trials was reached in a block of trials
with constant color–reward association (see Figure 1B
and Methods).
Monkeys Successfully Use Feature Values to
Guide Attention
Both monkeys were successful in 82.5% of trials (Monkey
M = 84.7% of 84,417 trials; Monkey S = 80.3% of 86,689
trials). Within blocks, monkeys required, on average,
12.5 trials to reach a performance level of 80% rewarded
trials when measuring average performance using a ±5
trials Gaussian-smoothed running average. Because learn-
ing is defined as consistent above-average performance
and not solely as overall high performance, we used a
statistical expectation maximization algorithm to estimate
when an ideal observer infers reliable learning from the
succession of monkey choices in a block (Smith et al.,
2004; see Methods). The ideal observer estimate showed
that Monkey M reached learning, on average, after 7.9 trials
(95% confidence range: 0.33) and Monkey S reached learn-
ing, on average, after 9.54 trials (95% confidence range:
0.45).
Overall performance level was stable across experi-
mental sessions as the monkeys had learned the task
structure during behavioral training sessions, which are
not included in the analysis. Asymptotic performance
measured across trials after initial learning was, on aver-
age, 87.3% correct (Monkey M: 89.1 ± 0.02%, Monkey S:
85.5 ± 0.02%; Figure 1C).
By task design, reversal blocks (i.e., block transitions
where the color of the two stimuli was maintained but
the color–reward association was reversed) represented
34% and 39% of the total number of blocks for Monkeys
M and S, respectively. The average performance in these
blocks was not significantly different from nonreversed
blocks for Monkey M ( p > .05, Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon
test) and only moderately different for Monkey S from
79.0% to 81.4% correct choices in reversed versus
Figure 6. Schemes of extended feature-based RL systems and results from the analysis of consecutive errors in them. (A) The value history
model incorporates in the covert attentional selection an influence toward previous choice. (B) The hierarchical value-history model first makes
a value-based selection (Pi) and then weights it by the previous selection in a second selection step. (C) For the adaptive selection model,
the transformation of Q-values to choice probabilities is dynamically shifted by the reward history. (D) The intrinsic noise model assumes that part
of monkeys’ performance stochasticity is independent of the value-based influences and distributes evenly among stimulus features. (E) Distribution
of consecutive errors for Monkeys M and S, for each of the extended models shown in A–D. The two left panels show how the proportion of
consecutive errors by monkeys (M: left, S: center) deviated from the proportion of errors that would be expected if errors were generated by a
random process (as in Figure 5). Only the hierarchical model captured this property of animals’ behavior. The bar plots (right) quantify the
SSD between the error pattern of monkeys (M: top, S: bottom) and models. Errors represent SEM.
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nonreversed blocks ( p < .05, Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon
test). In the following, we collapsed reversal and non-
reversal block types as there were no major results qual-
itatively different across block types.
To validate quantitatively that the color dimension
was the only feature used by animals to perform the task,
we used a logistic regression analysis (see Methods).
Sorting task features according to their subsequent pre-
dictive power for reward outcome through individual
trials confirmed that stimulus colors were maximally ex-
planatory of monkeys’ behavior, whereas noncolor fea-
tures had no systematic influence on the performance
(Figure 2).
Evidence for an Optimal Internal Representation
in the Learning of Feature Values
Having shown that animals were able to link choice out-
comes (reward obtained from upward and downward
saccades) to the feature that determined attentional se-
lection, three questions arise that are addressed in the
following: First, is there an optimal internal representa-
tion used to solve the task? Second, how are internal rep-
resentations of feature values updated after experiencing
outcomes? Third, is covert attentional selection fully de-
scribed according to value-based mechanisms, or are there
other non-value-based influences that systematically affect
attentional performance?
To identify the computational processes that could
control attentional selection, we devised and compared
two Rescorla–Wagner type of RL models (Glimcher,
2011; Figure 3A and B). We describe one model, with
a task set restricted to the relevant feature dimension
(color) as feature-based RL, because it contains an internal
model representation of only the relevant task features
(Figure 3A). We contrasted this model with nonselective
RL, which did not include any prior knowledge about
which of the available decision variables were systemati-
cally linked to reward but rather relied on tracking values
for all stimulus features that were available, including not
only stimulus color but also location, rotation direction,
and the time onset of rotations (Figure 3B).
Three independent criteria were combined to evaluate
RL models (1) to account for the dynamics of learning in
the task, (2) to analyze the plausibility of an RL mecha-
nism for explaining monkey performance, and (3) to
maximize the total number of trials in which monkey
and model performance matched, corrected to penalize
model biases against the least frequent outcome (see
Methods). The direct comparison of RL models according
to this evaluation revealed that the feature-based RL out-
performed the nonselective RL in predicting covert atten-
tional selection, evident in a significantly better (lower)
optimized compound score of model performance in
both monkeys (Figure 3C, feature-based vs. nonselective
RL, comparison across 10 model realizations: Monkey M,
p < .005; Monkey S, p < .001, Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon
test). The most prominent difference between models was
that the stochastic selection process was considerably
more deterministic (higher beta value) in the optimized
nonselective RL model compared with the feature-based
RL model (Figure 3D).
Despite the overall superiority of the feature-based RL
model, the two models were indistinguishable in predict-
ing the dynamics of learning within a block as inferred
from the average monkey performance, and both models
explained a similar proportion of animals’ covert atten-
tional selections in single trials (feature-based RL: Monkey
M/S: 78.2%/72.2%, nonselective RL: Monkey M/S: 78.5%/
71.5%; Figure 4A). The failure of nonselective RL became
evident only when we compared the output of the sto-
chastic selection process of the RL models with the selec-
tions made by the monkeys. Figure 4B illustrates that
the probability to select the relevant stimulus according
to the feature-based RL model closely followed the like-
lihood of correct choices made by the monkey (Figure 4B,
top, the diagonal line represents a perfect match). In
contrast, monkey choice likelihood deviated from the
probability dictated by the nonselective RL model
(Figure 4B, bottom). This result supports the suggestion
that choices of the monkeys depend on prior covert atten-
tional selection that operates on an internal representation
of task-relevant feature space.
Erroneous Choices Reveal Non-value-based
Selection Biases of Monkeys
The previous analysis showed that the probability of cor-
rect stimulus selections of the feature-based RL closely
resembled the likelihood of correct overt choices of the
monkeys on a trial-by-trial basis. This mechanism did not,
however, explain why monkeys were committing non-
randomly distributed errors during asymptotic perfor-
mance, that is, after they apparently had learned the
reward predicting color.
To identify the source of these errors, we analyzed
sequences of choices while at asymptotic performance
and found that erroneous choices clustered together
more often than expected by the performance of the
feature-based RL model. Among all erroneous choices
at peak behavior (M: 10.9%, S: 14.5%), consecutive errors
made up 40.8% of errors for Monkey M and 34.3% for
Monkey S (the proportional error patterns for monkey
M [S]: 59.2% [65.7%] for CEC [correct–error–correct]
successions, 24.2% [19.4%] for CEEC, 9.5% [9.0%] for
CEEEC, etc.). Figure 5 illustrates how this error pattern
deviated from a random distribution, revealing that both
monkeys committed less errors in isolation and more
errors in succession than expected for a stochastic error
generating process. As might be expected given its sto-
chastic selection mechanism, the feature-based RL system
(and also the nonselective RL system) failed to capture
this error pattern, both generating a pattern of errors
close to random (Figure 5).
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Value-based Attentional Selection Is Weighted by
Non-value-based Selection Biases
The failure to account for the observed error pattern
shows that feature-based RL must be complemented by
additional mechanisms to explain the animal’s attentional
performance pattern. We thus extended the feature-
based RL system and devised four additional models,
each with a distinct mechanism for explaining behavior
(see Methods). In particular, we tested the influence of
(1) a direct effect of value-independent selection history
onto feature-specific value representations (value history
model, Figure 6A), (2) a hierarchical two-step selection
process that incorporates an initial value-based feature
selection as well as a subsequent value-independent
input from selection history (hierarchical value-history
model, Figure 6B), (3) a dynamic regulation of the selec-
tion stochasticity based on recent reward history (adap-
tive selection model, Figure 6C), and (4) in the last
Figure 7. Average performance of monkeys and the four models that extend feature-based RL. (A and B) Results from Monkey M for (i) the value
history model, (ii) the hierarchical value-history model, (iii) the adaptive selection model, and (iv) the intrinsic noise model, respectively. In
A(i)–A(iv), the black shaded area shows the 95% CI around the mean for the monkey, in red for each model. B(i)–B(iv) show the averaged
performance and 95% CI (error bars) of Monkey M ( y axis) corresponding to five bins that fully span the range of the probability to select the
relevant stimulus. A plausible model candidate requires the model’s likelihood and monkey’s performance to match each other. The degree to
what this happens is quantified by the SSD. (C and D) Same as A and B for Monkey S.
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model, we tested the influence of added noise to the
system that is evenly distributed among choice features
(intrinsic noise model, Figure 6D).
We optimized each of the four extended RL models
separately using the compound criteria of model perfor-
mance as before. Across models, the hierarchical value-
history model and the adaptive selection model performed
best (Figures 7 and 8). However, given that these models
used additional parameters than the basic feature-based
RL (Figure 3A), the improvement in explaining correct
choices was at most marginal. However, in contrast to this
marginal effect with respect to predicting correct choices,
the prediction of erroneous choices separated model
performance. In particular, predicting the pattern of
consecutive errors revealed a clear advantage of the hier-
archical value-history model against feature-based RL
and each of the three remaining models in both monkeys
(Figure 6E). Thus, the hierarchical value-history model
closely predicted the error patterns evident in the two
monkeys. It predicted the monkey’s error patterns signifi-
cantly better than the value-history model (for Monkey M
[S]: p < .001 [.001], Kruskal–Wallis test), the adaptive se-
lection model (for Monkey M [S]: p< .001 [.001], Kruskal–
Wallis test), and the intrinsic noise model (for Monkey M
[S]: p < .001 [.001], Kruskal–Wallis test). It is noteworthy
that the prediction of error patterns was not an explicit
criterion during optimization but emerged from the se-
quential (two-step) selection mechanism intrinsic in the hi-
erarchical value-history model (Donoso et al., 2014; Ahn
et al., 2008).
Analysis of Value-independent Selection Biases
Biases for stimulus features indicate limits for RL model
predictions. Although our intrinsic noise model failed to
improve the predictive abilities of the model-based RL
framework, the distribution of errors observed in both
monkeys at asymptotic behavior (Figures 5 and 6E) sug-
gests that some non-value-based influence could affect
behavior, either at the point of stimuli selection or some-
where else in the decision-making process (see below).
To explore the role of possible biases relating to the
selection of stimulus features that are independent of re-
cent choice history, we ranked stimulus features accord-
ing to the proportion in which they were associated to
unrewarded trials (Figure 9). We found that both monkeys
demonstrated an almost even distribution of errors across
most of the task features indicating a similar likelihood
to make a choice across task features independent of the
task features’ local associated value. Thus, errors because
of non-value-based attentional biases did not represent a
dominant behavioral strategy systematically used by the
animals (Figure 2).
Figure 8. The optimization
scores and optimized
parameters for extended
models: the adaptive selection
model, the hierarchical
value-history model, the value
history model, and the intrinsic
noise model (see main text
and Figure 6). Monkeys M
and S results are shown in
red and blue shaded cells,
respectively.
Figure 9. Non-value-based feature biases measured as the proportion
of errors associated with each particular stimulus feature. Monkey S
(red dashed line) presents an overall larger proportion of errors than
Monkey M (red dashed line), and this pattern is systematic for each
feature pair (solid lines). In principle, this could be because of non-
value-based feature biases or explained by exploratory behavior.
Given that colors are the features that predict attentional selection
and eventually the behavioral choice (Figures 2 and 3), it might be
expected that exploratory behavior would mainly stay within this
dimension. However, we see that the proportion of errors is distributed
among all features, with no clear preference for colors. Features are
sorted from the highest to lowest feature biases according to Monkey S.
Shaded areas represent 95% CIs.
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DISCUSSION
We have shown that the learning of feature-based atten-
tional selection in macaque monkeys can be predicted
by models of RL with value-based selection mechanisms
acting on a restricted feature space. Value-based learning
explained the animals’ behavior better when the updat-
ing of value representations was restricted to the feature
dimension that was task relevant (color) and did not
consider those feature dimensions (location, rotation di-
rection, and time of rotation) that were not systematical-
ly linked to rewarding outcomes (in contrast to
nonselective RL). This finding provides quantitative evi-
dence in nonhuman primates that attentional selection
can act on a task-specific representation of relevant fea-
tures. Such feature representation can be formally de-
scribed as internal state model within the RL framework.
Implicit in this formulation is that attention is realized as a
stochastic covert selection acting on feature-specific value
predictions (Figure 10; Womelsdorf & Everling, 2015). A
second main finding of our study is that the process of
value-based attentional selection had to be complemen-
ted by an additional value-independent selection process
to account for nonrandom influences of selection history
on the pattern of erroneous choices.
Internal Value Predictions of Task-relevant
Features Provide the Reference for Attention
We found that value-based learning of attention is not
naive with respect to features in the environment that
are systematically linked to reward. When an animal re-
ceived a rewarding outcome, this reward was linked in
individual trials to a choice on a particular rotation direc-
tion (clockwise or counterclockwise), a particular time
onset (e.g., first or second), a particular location (left or
right), and color (e.g., blue) of the stimulus. If all these
task variables were considered equivalently while updat-
ing value representations, the nonselective RL controller
would have outperformed the feature-based learner, as
local correlations of nonrelevant features with reward
outcomes would have impacted on monkeys’ behavior.
Instead, these multiple features were not treated equally
in the credit assignment process (Figure 4B). The up-
dating of values was better described as being selective
to prioritized task-specific representations. This finding
highlights the idea that a key component of flexible atten-
tion lies in the evaluation process of how causal sources
of outcomes are identified and credited for producing
the outcome. This empirically derived conclusion sup-
ports previous modeling studies that implicate atten-
tional selection signals as critical gating signals for
plasticity and learning of task-relevant sensory features
(Rombouts, Bohte, Martinez-Trujillo, & Roelfsema,
2015; Alexander, 2007; Roelfsema & van Ooyen, 2005;
see also Roelfsema, van Ooyen, & Watanabe, 2010). In
summary, our findings show that the deployment of
attention can be efficiently adjusted according to feature–
reward associations. We should note that we could not
model the origins of the segmentation of task-relevant
variables in the current data set that was limited to later
stages of task learning. However, we believe that it is an
important future task to extend the feature-based RLmodel
to include the learning of a segmentation between task-
relevant and task-irrelevant features by processes using
either meta-learning mechanisms (Ardid, Balcarras, &
Womelsdorf, 2014; Gershman &Niv, 2010) or, for example,
by adding an independent slow learning process that tracks
input statistics and derives policies from it (Legenstein,
Wilbert, & Wiskott, 2010).
Attentional Flexibility versus Stickiness
After steep reversal learning, theperformanceofmonkeys did
not reach optimality, but rather, animals continued to make
wrong, unrewarded choices in 10–15% of all trials during a
Figure 10. Separable processes underlying learning of attentional
selection. Attentional selection relies on a covert decision-making
process that is suitable to evaluate all stimulus features (i.e., color,
location, etc.) but that, after practice, prioritizes the subset of relevant
stimulus features that systematically link to reward (e.g., color
dimension). In each trial, a particular covert attentional selection of a
stimulus (green stimulus in the example) is established by value-based
competition among elements in the task set representation. Values
are then updated according to the response outcome. Note that the
specific response outcome critically depends on a proper attentional
selection to bias the relevant sensory processing (e.g., rotation
discrimination) and, as a result, trigger an adequate sensory-response
mapping (e.g., upward saccadic response to report a clockwise
rotation).
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period where expected values for stimulus color were at
a constant high level. We found that this 10–15% failure
rate can be traced back to three identifiable sources that
are informative about the processes controlling attention.
The largest proportion of errors was accounted for by
the softmax stochastic selection process (through the β
parameter) that imposed a nonzero probability to select
the stimulus features with the lowest values. This aspect
is important because it supports the notion that attention
can be conceptualized as a stochastic selection process sim-
ilar to conceptualization of overt (motor) choice (Gottlieb,
2012; Rangel & Hare, 2010).
A second source of errors in our task are feature biases
of the animals that are independent of fluctuations in
value predictions and reflect “default” tendencies of ani-
mals choices (see Figure 9), although the animals could
not (and did not) systematically deploy such simple strat-
egies to solve our task (Shteingart & Loewenstein, 2014;
Figure 2).
The third source of erroneous performance referred ex-
plicitly to the pattern of errors that deviated from a purely
stochastic process once in an asymptotic regime, with an
evident tendency to repeat erroneous (unrewarded)
choices (Figures 5 and 6). Both animals showed this devi-
ation from random error generation, resembling persev-
eration tendencies and habit intrusions known from the
motor domain. However, the repeated errors in our task
referred to repetitions of the attentional selection (i.e.,
based on color) from the previous trial. Only a single
model was able to capture this error pattern by means of
a sequential (two-step) process that complemented the
basic value-based selection with a second selection pro-
cess that pushed the final overt choice toward the previous
selection.
Such a weighting of a current trial’s value-based selec-
tion is in fact an efficient strategy when the previous selec-
tion was rewarded; hence, repeating the same attentional
selection is, in such a condition, a strategy that reduces
effort and costs (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013).
However, when the previous trial’s covert choice was an
error and led to no reward, weighting the current value-
based selection toward the nonrewarded previous covert
choice is detrimental and incurs costs. This cost of com-
mitting two or more consecutive errors represented a
substantial subproportion of error trials (34–41% of the
10–15% total number of errors in the task), which may
relate to the actual cost the animals are able to tolerate
in the control of attention, given the effort it would take
for them to improve performance. This interpretation is
consistent with a recent proposal that quantifies the ex-
pected value of (attentional) control by estimating the
(sum of anticipated) payoffs against the costs to establish
sufficiently strong control to obtain such payoffs (Shenhav
et al., 2013). According to this interpretation, the cost of
committing errors in our task is traded against the level
of effort (i.e., strength of control) that would be required
to improve performance (number of rewarded trials). In
particular, in our task, improving performance requires
constant updating of feature value representations and
covert stimulus selection. We can thus speculate that the
hypothesized quantity about the expected control intensity
is related to the γ parameter in our hierarchical value-
history model, which is adjusted to each monkey’s trade-
off between effort and payoff. The lower this parameter,
the higher is the effort to receive more value-based payoffs,
and on the contrary, the higher the parameter, the larger is
the attentional stickiness and the tendency to perseverate
on previous attentional selections.
Implications for Models of Attention: Value- and
Non-value-based Processes
The success in explaining actual attentional learning in
primates with a feature-based RL mechanism that is
weighted with an attentional stickiness process has further
implications for theories of attention.
First, the results suggest that the valuation system
plays a key role to determine to what features selective
attention is shifted to, independently of the saliency of
those features (Womelsdorf & Everling, 2015; Krauzlis,
Bollimunta, Arcizet, & Wang, 2014; Chelazzi et al., 2013;
Kaping et al., 2011; Tatler et al., 2011; Navalpakkam,
Koch, Rangel, & Perona, 2010). Value representations in
the RL framework are predictions of stimulus values (pre-
dictions of outcomes), demonstrating that the covert
control of visual attention can be understood from a pre-
dictive coding perspective such that feature value pre-
dictions resemble reward value predictions in the domain
of overt goal-directed behavior, decision-making, and
planning (van der Meer, Kurth-Nelson, & Redish, 2012;
Wilson & Niv, 2011; Seymour & McClure, 2008; Dehaene
& Changeux, 2000). This conclusion resonates well with
studies documenting the influence of expectations for
visual perception and perceptual inferences (Series & Seitz,
2013; Summerfield & Egner, 2009), the influence of sec-
ondary reward associations to modify basic visual search
efficiency (Anderson et al., 2011), and a growing litera-
ture documenting the influence of actual attentional ex-
periences to shape reward memories and attentional
priorities through learning mechanisms (Gottlieb, Hayhoe,
Hikosaka, & Rangel, 2014; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Awh,
Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009).
Second, attention in our task also depends on a second
process that weights the value-based selection based on
repeating the selection of previous trials irrespective of
whether that selection was rewarded or unrewarded.
Such a reward-insensitive mechanism is particularly use-
ful in probabilistic choice contexts where the lack of re-
ward at one occasion can be a mere stochastic event that
is better ignored to maximize reward intake in the long
run (Lau & Glimcher, 2005). In our task with a deter-
ministic reward schedule within blocks of trials, the
weighting of the current choice toward previous choices
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is reminiscent of (1) previous trial effects in stimulus–
response learning tasks (Fecteau & Munoz, 2003) and
shares similarity with (2) habitual stimulus response con-
trol (Dolan & Dayan, 2013), (3) habit intrusions (de Wit
et al., 2012), (4) behavioral perseverations and stickiness
(Dayan & Berridge, 2014; Huys et al., 2011), and (5) inter-
trial priming and repetition memory effects (Anderson,
2013; Awh et al., 2012; Kristjansson & Campana, 2010;
Kristjansson, 2006). All these listed effects are empirical
demonstrations of the apparent influence of a memory
of recent choices and attentional selections on current
attentional performance. Whether these various history
and memory effects serve as primary controllers of atten-
tional selections or should better be conceived of as
modulators of attention will be a question for future re-
search. Our findings are more supportive of the former
suggestion, revealing that selection history influences
attentional performance in such a dominant way that it
should be considered a separate control process under-
lying attentional selection, which complements value-
based control.
Conclusion and Outlook
Taken together, we have illustrated a formal framework
of attentional selection in nonhuman primates that pro-
vides explicit and testable hypotheses about the specific
subprocesses underlying attentional control. Our hierar-
chical value-history RL model specifies these three main
attentional subprocesses as (1) the feature-specific learn-
ing of value predictions, (2) the stochastic value-based
selection process, and (3) a non-value-based memory
bias that drives the system toward previously selected
information. We speculate that the very structures impli-
cated in stimulus valuation, RL, and decision-making are
key structures in controlling the focus of visual attention
(Womelsdorf & Everling, 2015). Each of these processes
is possibly associated with separable neuronal circuits in
the primate prefrontal, striatal, and medial-temporal lobe
systems. Circuits within prefrontal regions presumably
include the lateral pFC, an area that may not have an
anatomical and functional analog in the nonprimate brain
(Passingham & Wise, 2012). Our study in nonhuman pri-
mates could thus become a versatile starting point to
understand how multiple choice systems and subpro-
cesses underlying stimulus selection interact to control
attention in primates.
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